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Abstract
By transferring risks and responsibilities to the private sector, governments hope that 
public–private partnerships (PPPs) bring about innovations in transport infrastructure 
development. Taking the position that a PPP is not equal to outsourcing, this article 
explores the role of the public partner in innovation in infrastructure PPPs. To this 
purpose, nine Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) projects in Dutch transport 
infrastructure development were systematically analyzed with qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA). The results show that the presence of innovation is associated with 
multiple, nonexclusive combinations of three conditions: the procurement result of 
the partnership contract, the composition of the private construction consortium, 
and the project management by the public partner (i.e., stakeholder management, 
technical management, and contract management). In particular, the public partner’s 
choice to enter into a PPP with a construction consortium consisting of a small 
number of firms is associated with innovation.
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Introduction
Research on public–private partnerships (PPPs) has focused on topics such as the 
transfer, allocation, and management of risks, the financing models, and the perfor-
mance of PPPs in terms of efficiency (Cui, Liu, Hope, & Wang, 2018; Tang, Shen, & 
Cheng, 2010). In recent years, the use of PPPs to stimulate sustainable development 
and innovation in public infrastructure projects—including transport infrastructure 
projects such as road and waterway infrastructure—has also been encouraged (Caloffi, 
Pryke, Sedita, & Siemiatycki, 2017). It is often argued that PPPs may drive creativity 
and innovation through factors such as design freedom for the private partner, long-
term commitment, competition between bidders, collaborative working, and risk 
transfer to the private sector (Himmel & Siemiatycki, 2017; Hueskes & Verhoest, 
2015; Leiringer, 2006; Rangel & Galende, 2010; e.g., The European PPP Expertise 
Centre, 2015). Innovations in PPPs are said to lead to increased efficiency of infra-
structure development and management (The European PPP Expertise Centre, 2015), 
result in higher quality infrastructure solutions that are better able to address the social 
complexity involved in project implementation (Lenferink, Leendertse, Arts, & 
Tillema, 2014), and contribute to finding solutions for major societal challenges such 
as climate change and urban sustainability (e.g., Koenen, 2018; Witters, Marom, & 
Steinert, 2012). These advantages of innovations in PPPs notwithstanding, Leiringer 
(2006) identified that “the publications that endorse PPP as arenas promoting innova-
tion are based on anecdotal evidence and wishful thinking” (p. 303). To date, the 
empirical evidence of PPPs’ ability to stimulate innovation has remained scarce 
(Himmel & Siemiatycki, 2017; Hueskes & Verhoest, 2015). Reasons may include that 
collaborative working in PPPs is challenging (Verweij, 2015) and that private con-
struction consortia are often incentivized to minimize risks in PPPs, which may lead 
to only incremental innovations (Himmel & Siemiatycki, 2017; Roumboutsos & 
Saussier, 2014). It thus seems that innovation is not an intrinsic part of PPPs (Rangel 
& Galende, 2010).
This raises the question of how PPPs may be able to bring about innovations in 
transport infrastructure development effectively. Research has indicated that the afore-
mentioned factors may indeed stimulate innovation (e.g., Akintoye, Hardcastle, Beck, 
Chinyio, & Asenova, 2003; Rangel & Galende, 2010; Uyarra, Edler, Garcia-Estevez, 
Georghiou, & Yeow, 2014). These studies, however, focused on the ways in which 
contracts, or precontract competition, incentivize innovation behavior by the private 
partner. Research has largely neglected the role of the public partner in innovation in 
PPPs (Rangel & Galende, 2010). Although recent work has started to emphasize the 
public partner’s role in innovation (e.g., Roberts & Siemiatycki, 2015), more empiri-
cal research is needed into this topic, especially comparative work that goes beyond 
single cases and anecdotal evidence (Rangel & Galende, 2010). The present article 
addresses this research gap by conducting a systematic comparison of the role of the 
public partner in nine Dutch PPP projects.
Innovation is defined in the study as technological product and process (TPP) inno-
vations, which comprise “implemented technologically new products and processes 
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and significant technological improvements in products and processes” (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] & Eurostat, 1997; in Leiringer, 
2006, p. 303). The focus of the study is on proposed innovations that are incorporated 
in the bids of private consortia in the tender. The innovations are further worked out 
after the contract award. Contracts are awarded based on both price and quality crite-
ria; hence, the innovations allow the consortia to gain a competitive advantage over 
the other tenderers because they lead to higher quality transport infrastructure and 
lower costs, thus potentially increasing the private consortia’s profit margins as well as 
their competitive position in the international market. Three conditions are explored 
that concern the role of the public partner in innovation in PPPs.
The first is the public partner’s choice to award the contract to a bid with a high 
procurement result (Verweij, Van Meerkerk, & Korthagen, 2015). A high procure-
ment result means that the contract value of the partnership is lower than was esti-
mated by the public partner before the bidding process. Provided that the public 
procurer is able to make a proper design and cost calculation and specify the quality 
and functionality criteria, a high procurement result may indicate that the private 
partner has found smarter and more innovative solutions with at least the same qual-
ity and functionality. The second condition is the choice for a certain composition of 
the private construction consortium (cf. Spescha, 2018). Literature suggests that con-
sortia consisting of a small number of small firms may have a collaborative advan-
tage over, and lower transaction costs than, consortia with a larger number of firms, 
thus increasing the potential for innovation. The third condition concerns the project 
management by the public partner (cf. Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018). This condi-
tion focuses on the role played by the public partner during the implementation of the 
project, that is, after the contract award (Verweij, 2015), in particular the stakeholder 
management, contract management, and technical management by the public partner 
(Reinking, 2014). Innovations with environmental and technical impact will ask for 
more management support by the public partner to implement them interactively and 
effectively in the often-complex stakeholder environments of the projects. As such, 
increased public technical and stakeholder management may indicate that the private 
partner is more creative and innovative compared with the design drawings in the 
tendering documents. At the same time, it means that the public partner facilitates the 
use of innovations.
This article investigates the role of the public partner in innovation in PPPs by 
exploring the associations between the three conditions and innovation. The research 
question is as follows: What are the associations in infrastructure PPPs between pro-
curement result, consortium composition, and public project management on one 
hand, and innovation by private partners on the other hand?
This article continues in the section “Innovation in Transport Infrastructure PPPs,” 
with further introducing and defining the central concepts of the study: innovation, 
procurement result, composition of the private construction consortium, and project 
management by the public partner. Nine Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) 
projects in Dutch transport infrastructure development were analyzed with qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA). DBFM projects are a type of PPP where the private 
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partner is integrally responsible for designing, building, maintaining, and (partly) 
financing the infrastructure development (Lenferink, Tillema, & Arts, 2013). The sec-
tion “Data and Method” presents and explains the cases, data, and methods used for 
the QCA-analysis. QCA is a relatively novel method in research on PPPs (e.g., Kort, 
Verweij, & Klijn, 2016; Soecipto & Verhoest, 2018; Verweij, 2015). It is highly suit-
able for systematically analyzing a small or medium number of cases and its configu-
rational nature allows the researcher to explore how conditions together are associated 
with a certain outcome of interest (Berg-Schlosser, De Meur, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2009; 
Gerrits & Verweij, 2018). The section “Analysis and Results” provides the analysis 
and the results. The section “Discussion and Conclusion” comprises the discussion of 
the results, the limitations of the research, and the final conclusions.
Innovation in Transport Infrastructure PPPs
PPPs and Innovation
Project innovation can generally be categorized into product, process, organizational–
contractual, and financial innovation (Russell, Tawiah, & De Zoysa, 2006; Tawiah & 
Russell, 2008). Organizational–contractual and financial innovations concern, inter 
alia, the negotiation of risk assignment, contractual terms regarding performance-
based payment mechanisms, and off-balance-sheet financing (Russell et al., 2006). 
For many years, these have also been the core motivations to develop transport infra-
structure through PPPs (Eversdijk & Korsten, 2015; McQuaid & Scherrer, 2010). In 
Dutch DBFM projects, risks and responsibilities for designing, building, maintaining, 
and (partly) financing the infrastructure development have been transferred to the pri-
vate sector (Lenferink et al., 2013) and performance-based payment mechanisms are 
used to incentivize the private partner to perform well (Reynaers, 2015). With the 
organizational–contractual and financial innovations now being default in Dutch 
PPPs, particularly in DBFM, at the beginning of the century the motivation for PPPs 
shifted toward their ability to stimulate innovation themselves (Eversdijk & Korsten, 
2015). PPPs became popular for the “optimal use of available resources and to pro-
mote entrepreneurship and innovation” (Rutte & Samsom, 2012, p. 37) and for the 
realization of “added or surplus value” (Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2012; 
Rijkswaterstaat, 2014a; Rijkswaterstaat et al., 2016). However, to date, the empirical 
evidence of PPPs’ ability to stimulate innovation has remained scarce (Himmel & 
Siemiatycki, 2017; Hueskes & Verhoest, 2015), a concern that is also echoed by policy 
makers (see e.g., Koenen, 2018).
Hence, this article considers product and process innovations in infrastructure proj-
ects and focuses on how such innovations can be stimulated through PPPs. Innovations 
concern “significant technological improvements” in both products and processes 
(OECD & Eurostat, 1997, p. 31). Product innovation includes the development of new 
products and—because the construction industry is an innovation adopter rather than 
developer—the use of new products, for example, advanced construction equipment 
and tools, novel product assemblies, novel designs or concepts, the use of advanced 
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technology in the operation and maintenance phase, and new materials (Russell et al., 
2006; Tawiah & Russell, 2008). In PPPs and in DBFM projects in particular, however, 
the private partner not only delivers products (e.g., tunnel systems or new roads) but 
also provides services (e.g., the maintenance of tunnels and roads; Yescombe, 2007). 
Therefore, product innovation includes the development and use of innovations in 
provided products and services (OECD & Eurostat, 2005). Process innovations con-
cern new or significantly improved methods or skills that are used to construct the 
product or perform the service (OECD & Eurostat, 2005). Examples include logistical 
technologies, site preparation, off-site fabrication and construction methods, assem-
bling technologies, and information technology tools in the processes of project design 
and management (Russell et al., 2006; Tawiah & Russell, 2008).
In the following subsections, the three conditions of the study are elaborated. The 
conditions were selected in consultation with managers of Rijkswaterstaat, the execu-
tive agency of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management. Especially 
these conditions appeared regularly in the discussions about procurement through 
PPPs as they concern the role of the public partner in innovation in PPPs. Moreover, 
internal information was available on them.
Procurement Result
By transferring risks and responsibilities for the integral design, build, finance, and 
maintenance of infrastructure to the private sector, a possibility is created for the 
private consortium to find innovative solutions through integrated designs and pro-
cesses and life cycle optimization (Himmel & Siemiatycki, 2017; Lenferink et al., 
2013). The idea is that the private partner will be able to design products and pro-
cesses more efficiently (i.e., with lower costs), stimulating innovative solutions 
(Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011).
A measure for gauging the private partner’s need for efficiency improvement is the 
procurement result. The procurement result is the difference between the value of the 
contract that the public procurer estimated prior to the tender and the actual value of 
the contract that was concluded between the public and private partners (Verweij et al., 
2015). A high procurement result means that the contract value of the partnership is 
lower than was estimated by the public procurer. Possibly, this could be explained by 
opportunistic bidding behavior by the contractors (Mohamed, Khoury, & Hafez, 
2011). However, a previous study into Dutch transport infrastructure projects found 
that, although, on average, the concluded contract value was 23.8% lower than esti-
mated by the public procurer prior to the tender, there was no evidence for opportunis-
tic bidding behavior by private partners (Verweij et al., 2015).
An alternative explanation, which is explored in the present article, is that a high 
procurement result may indicate that private consortia have incorporated creative and 
innovative ideas in their bids. Because contracts are awarded based on price and qual-
ity criteria, the innovations should lead to higher or equal quality at lower costs, which 
allows tendering consortia to gain a competitive advantage over the other tenderers. 
Assuming that the public procurer is able to make a proper design and cost calculation 
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and specify the quality and functionality criteria, this translates into a higher procure-
ment result. For this explanation to hold, the development or use of the product or 
process innovation has to stem from the private partner (market-driven) and not from 
the project scope defined by the public procurer in the tendering documents (including 
design drawings) for the DBFM contract (client-driven; cf. Möller, Rajala, & 
Westerlund, 2008). Through this line of reasoning, a high procurement result may 
indicate that the private consortium felt an incentive in the tendering to incorporate 
creative ideas and innovation in its bid (Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011; Himmel & 
Siemiatycki, 2017).
Composition of the Private Construction Consortium
DBFM contracts are usually applied to large projects (in terms of scope and budget). 
In the Netherlands, for instance, DBFM is applied in principle only to infrastructure 
projects with a minimal contract value of €60 million (Ministerie van Financiën, 
2013, 2016). As a result, DBFM contracts usually involve bids by firms of sufficient 
size and/or bids made by multiple firms to share the risks and complement 
knowledge.
Two lines of reasoning pertain to the composition of the construction consortium. 
The first relates to the size of the firms in the consortium (Lu & Sexton, 2006; Spescha, 
2018). On one hand, small firms are said to have communication and coordination 
advantages, lower fragility due to small project sizes, and a better self-selection of able 
researchers (Spescha, 2018). Moreover, small firms may have stronger creative capac-
ities and a stronger drive to innovate to gain market share. On the other hand, innova-
tion or the capacity to innovate may also increase with firm size. Reasons may include 
that larger firms are more prone to governmental and societal pressures to innovate 
(e.g., Qi, Shen, Zeng, & Jorge, 2010) and that larger firms benefit from larger R&D 
budgets, driving innovation (Spescha, 2018). Both small and large firm sizes may thus 
be associated with innovation (Goffin & Mitchell, 2017), although literature seems to 
be slightly in favor of a small firm size being favorable for innovation (Tidd, Bessant, 
& Pavitt, 2005).
The second line of reasoning concerns the number of firms in the construction con-
sortium. A higher number of firms may increase the innovation potential because more 
and complementary resources are bundled (cf. Himmel & Siemiatycki, 2017). 
However, larger numbers of firms may require a network of mutual contracts, poten-
tially decreasing flexibility and effective collaboration, contributing to less innovation 
(Russell et al., 2006). Moreover, risk allocation becomes more fragmented, which may 
divert firms’ focus away from developing or using product innovations (Barlow & 
Köberle-Gaiser, 2009). Instead, a small number of firms is conducive of collaborative 
working and trust building, which are both driving factors for innovation (Eaton, 
Akbiyikli, & Dickinson, 2006; Weihe, 2008). The literature thus seems to be slightly 
in favor of a few small firms being associated with innovation (Tidd et al., 2005). This 
assumption will be further explored through the analyses in this article.
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Project Management by the Public Partner
Research on PPPs has shown that, more so than the organizational–contractual charac-
teristics of PPPs, the project management is of pivotal importance for project perfor-
mance (e.g., Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Kort et al., 2016). Typically, in DBFM projects, 
the public and private partners establish their own project management organizations 
as separate organizations working together. DBFM projects differ in this respect from, 
for example, alliances where one integral management team is established. In PPPs, 
the private partner is largely responsible for actual project management, but project 
management by the public partner remains important to achieve good outcomes 
(Verweij, Teisman, & Gerrits, 2017). Because it may complement each other’s skill 
sets and resources and may establish favorable institutional conditions for innovation, 
the deployment of project management capacities by the public partner may be associ-
ated with innovation in PPPs (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018; Himmel & Siemiatycki, 
2017; Rangel & Galende, 2010).
However, the relationship between public project management and innovation is 
not straightforward (Savini, Majoor, & Salet, 2015). On one hand, project manage-
ment revolves around controlling the environment and the actions of actors in it, 
thus possibly constraining innovation. On the other hand, given the dynamic envi-
ronments of projects and the strict time and budget boundaries, the need for enabling 
innovation is also recognized. This article sheds further light on the complex rela-
tionship between public project management and innovation. In the Netherlands, 
five different public project management roles are distinguished in transport infra-
structure development, which come together in the integrated project management 
(IPM) model (Reinking, 2014; Rijkswaterstaat, 2014b): general project manage-
ment, project control, stakeholder management, technical management, and contract 
management. The latter three management roles are particularly important when it 
comes to innovation as they specifically focus on coordination, analysis, and effect 
mitigation.
The stakeholder manager’s responsibilities focus on the general management of 
project internal–external relationships and the information exchange and communica-
tion between the project organization and the stakeholders (Reinking, 2014). His or 
her tasks are akin to the “coordination capacity” of governments, which focuses on the 
government’s role in managing networks of actors, boundary spanning, bringing actors 
together, and intermediating between actors (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018; Lodge 
& Wegrich, 2014). Public stakeholder managers may put their coordination capacity to 
work through actions such as organizing workshops and meetings, involving relevant 
actors, negotiation and lobbying, and collaboration. These actions bring together com-
plementary skills and resources, which is important for innovation (Grotenbreg & Van 
Buuren, 2018). More important, however, is that the innovative solutions proposed in 
the private consortia’s bids may ask for more intensive stakeholder management by 
the public partner because novel solutions have to be interactively implemented in the 
often-complex stakeholder environment of the project, for instance, via living labs 
(Neef, Verweij, Gugerell, & Moen, 2017).
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The technical manager is responsible for the technical input in the project. He or 
she translates the client’s demands into project requirements in the tendering docu-
ments and uses systems engineering to manage the implementation of the project 
(Reinking, 2014). The public technical manager’s tasks bear resemblance to the “ana-
lytical capacity” of governments. By such actions as commissioning studies, supply-
ing information for permit applications, supporting subsidy/grant applications, 
investigating possibilities for innovation, and conducting market consultations 
(Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018), he or she contributes to increased knowledge 
“about future projections and current developments” (Lodge & Wegrich, 2014, p. 16). 
His or her actions bring “new knowledge into play (. . .) and encourage transformative 
learning and out of the box thinking” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2012; in Grotenbreg & Van 
Buuren, 2018, p. S47). By decreasing uncertainty and increasing learning, the riski-
ness of innovations may be reduced. Because the manager’s actions facilitate the 
implementation and use of innovations, the innovative solutions in private consortia’s 
bids may thus call upon the capacity of technical managers from the public partner.
The contract manager’s responsibilities focus on the management of the contractual 
relationship between the public partner (client) and private partner (contractor) in the 
project (Wermer, 2012). His or her tasks include determining the procurement need, 
drafting the tendering documents and the contract dossiers, and contract control during 
the implementation of the project (Reinking, 2014). Whereas a high deployment of 
stakeholder and technical management capacities is expected to be associated with 
innovation, this may be less straightforward for contract management. On one hand, 
the contract manager may give temporary permissions, accept risks, and adjust or 
develop rules which facilitate the private partner in the implementation and use of 
innovations (cf. Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018). On the other hand, contract manag-
ers are involved in controlling risks and regulating the project management by the 
private partner, which may decrease its flexibility and hence possibilities to innovate 
(Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010). The analysis in this article may shed light on the rela-
tionship between contract management by the public partner and innovation.
Data and Method
Data Collection and Cases
The data for the study were collected via questionnaires (for innovation) and from the 
Project Database of Rijkswaterstaat (for the three conditions). In the Netherlands, 
Rijkswaterstaat is the procurer of major transportation infrastructure. Since 2010, it 
integrated all its project data into a single database. Access to the data and publishing 
about the data was allowed by Rijkswaterstaat, with the provision that the data and 
results are carefully anonymized and cannot be traced back to specific persons or 
projects. The data collection took place between April and July 2018. Rijkswaterstaat 
managers and experts were consulted during the data collection process to increase 
the reliability of the data and to retrieve missing data where possible. By collecting 
and analyzing data that are actually used by Rijkswaterstaat for project management 
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and accountability purposes, this contributed to the practical relevance of the study. 
The database contained 14 DBFM projects in transport infrastructure (i.e., roads and 
waterways) that had actually reached their implementation phase (i.e., after the con-
tract award). One project was devoid of data and was excluded from the data set.
All remaining 13 projects are planned to finish their implementation phase (i.e., 
design and build) before the end of 2020. Their contract values range from approxi-
mately €60 million to €1.5 billion. Rijkswaterstaat is the client for each contract. The 
private partners in the projects are consortia consisting of two to seven firms, with the 
exception of one project with a private partner consisting of a single firm. The cases 
include tunnels, bridges, roads, and waterways/locks. They characterize as complex 
cases with multiple governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders (cf. De Schepper, 
Dooms, & Haezendonck, 2014; Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010).
Measurement and Data
The degree of innovation was measured using the “baseline innovation measurement” 
developed by the Department of Innovation and Market of Rijkswaterstaat. The mea-
surement consists of five questions that assess whether and which innovations were 
developed in the project, whether the innovation was market-driven or client-driven, 
and whether the innovation was used and diffused. These data were collected through 
questionnaires (in Dutch, based on the “baseline innovation measurement”) that were 
completed by the technical managers of the studied projects. Innovation was regarded 
to be either present or absent. For two projects, the innovation data could not be 
retrieved and these cases were thus not included in the analysis. Table A1 in the appen-
dix provides some more details on the innovations in the cases.
The innovations in the remaining 11 projects include the energy-neutral operation 
and production of infrastructure (e.g., energy-neutral locks or the installation of solar 
panels as part of the infrastructure development), circular designs (e.g., flyovers) and 
production methods (e.g., recycling concrete or new types of asphalt with longer life 
spans), maintenance innovations (e.g., removable road linings on asphalt), and new 
process management tools and pilots (e.g., DuboCalc software to calculate the envi-
ronmental impact of materials used). Innovations occurred in eight of the 11 projects 
(73%). In one of those eight cases, the innovation was client-driven instead of 
market-driven.
Following Verweij et al. (2015), the procurement result was measured by first cal-
culating the difference between the contract value estimated by the public procurer, on 
one hand, and the actual awarded contract value, on the other hand. This number was 
then divided by the estimated contract value to retrieve a percentage. For the estimated 
contract value, the business-economic estimate was used, known in Dutch as the 
BE-raming (Ministerie van Verkeer & Waterstaat, 1997). For both the estimated and 
the actual contract value, the net present value (NPV) of the project was used. Data 
were available for 11 of the 13 cases. The average procurement result is 30.6%.
The composition of the private construction consortium was measured by counting 
the number of construction firms in the consortium and by the firms’ sizes. The number 
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of firms in the 13 cases varied from one to seven. Firm size was measured as the reve-
nue of the participating construction firms as published in the companies’ annual reports 
for 2016. Across the 13 cases, it ranged from approximately €75 million to €19,910 
million. One firm was an outlier with revenue of approximately €40,000 million.
The public project management was measured by the amount of full-time equiva-
lent (FTE) allocated by Rijkswaterstaat to each of the three project management roles. 
Data were available for 12 cases. The management functions (e.g., the stakeholder 
manager) and the supporting functions (e.g., advisor stakeholder management) were 
added together. Per management role, the average FTE of the first 3 years of the proj-
ect’s implementation phase was taken. For four of the 12 cases, only one (two projects) 
or two (two projects) implementation years were available. After the FTEs for the 
management roles were calculated, they were converted to percentages of the total 
number of FTEs in the respective projects, to account for the fact that larger projects 
are allocated more FTEs than smaller projects. Across the 12 projects, the FTE allo-
cated to stakeholder management was on average 22.9%; for technical management 
this was 29.2%; and for contract management this was 25.6%.
Method: QCA
The data were analyzed with QCA (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018). QCA is a case-based 
method that helps to systematically and transparently analyze how different configu-
rations of conditions—in the present article: procurement result, consortium compo-
sition, and public project management—are associated with the outcome of interest 
(in this article: innovation). The relationships between the conditions and the out-
come are expressed in terms of necessity and sufficiency (Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012). The method is also particularly suitable for data sets with a small-to-medium 
number of cases.
The first step in the application of the method is the calibration of the data, for 
which QCA relies on set theory (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Each condition and 
the outcome are understood as sets and cases have a membership in each set ranging 
from 0.00 (fully out the set) to 1.00 (fully in the set). Calibration helps to distinguish 
relevant and irrelevant variation between cases (with cases with the same set member-
ship score having irrelevant variation) and to prepare the data for transparent compari-
son. Preferably, criteria external to the data at hand are used to determine the set 
membership categories. If these are not available, a cluster analysis can be used to 
distinguish the groups of cases (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018). Calibration is an iterative 
process between theoretical expectations and the empirical data and should hence be 
discussed in detail (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018); it results in a calibrated data matrix (see 
the section “Calibration Rules and Calibrated Data”).
The second step is the transformation of the calibrated data matrix into the truth 
table, which sorts the cases across the logically possible combinations of conditions 
(i.e., the logically possible configurations; Gerrits & Verweij, 2018). Each truth table 
row represents one logically possible configuration. Based on the calibrated data 
matrix, each case is assigned to the truth table row to which it belongs. Thereafter, 
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based on the outcome scores of the cases, the truth table row is assessed to show inno-
vation (score of 1) or not (score of 0).
The third step is the analysis of the truth table, which involves the pairwise com-
parison of truth table rows that agree on the outcome (here: presence of innovation) 
and differ in only one of the conditions. The condition that differs is minimized away. 
This minimization process leads to a so-called solution formula, which may consist of 
several mutually nonexclusive configurations that are associated with the outcome of 
interest. The mutually nonexclusive configurations (i.e., equifinality) are also called 
“conjunctions” or “paths” and they express that conditions form conjunctions with 
other conditions. In this way, QCA helps to shed light on the complex relationships 
between the conditions and innovation in PPPs and on the different roles that the pub-
lic partner can assume in PPP projects. Because the size of the truth table increases 
exponentially with each condition that is added, limited diversity may occur (Schneider 
& Wagemann, 2012). Limited diversity is expressed as truth table rows without any 
cases, which are consequently not included in the minimization, leading to a more 
complex solution formula (see e.g., Gerrits & Verweij, 2018). To curtail limited diver-
sity, analyses were conducted separately for the different management roles (see the 
section “Analysis and Results”). The analyses were conducted with the fs/QCA soft-
ware (Ragin, 2017; Ragin & Davey, 2017).
Calibration Rules and Calibrated Data
Regarding the outcome innovation, projects that clearly showed the development and 
use of one or more product or process innovations were assigned a set membership 
score of 1.00. Projects without any innovation were assigned a score of 0.00. One 
project showed some innovation, but lower than expected. In that case, multiple inno-
vations were provided by the market, but they were not actually realized in the project. 
Therefore, the case received a score of 0.33 (Case-L; see Table 2).
Verweij et al. (2015) found an average procurement result of 23.8%. A first calibra-
tion attempt using that value to distinguish cases that are more out the set (0.0 ≤ x < 
0.5) from cases that are more in the set (0.5 < x ≤ 1.0) resulted in almost all the cases 
having a high procurement result. Therefore, we instead performed a cluster analysis 
for the calibration, using the QCA software “Tosmana” (Cronqvist, 2011), and identi-
fied four clusters: low procurement result (0.00) [7.15%-20.1%], medium procure-
ment result (0.33) [20.2%-29.5%], high procurement result (0.66) [29.6%-37.2%], and 
very high procurement result (1.00) [37.3%-55.4%]. In QCA, higher set membership 
scores (0.5 < x ≤ 1.0) are expected to be associated with the presence of the outcome 
(Rihoux & De Meur, 2009). The calibration thus expresses the expectation that a high 
procurement result is associated with innovation by the private partner (see the section 
“Procurement Result”).
Regarding the composition of the private construction consortium, as discussed in 
the section “Composition of the Private Construction Consortium,” literature does not 
provide unambiguous expectations regarding the relationship between firm size and 
innovation, although it seems to be slightly in favor of a small firm size being 
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associated with innovation. Literature is a bit clearer on the fact that smaller numbers 
of firms are more likely to contribute to innovation. Given these considerations, more 
weight is given in the calibration to the number of firms than to firm size, resulting in 
the calibration scheme depicted in Table 1.
After consulting experts from Rijkswaterstaat, the cutoff point for the number of 
firms was set at three firms, based on the reasoning that in infrastructure construction 
there are at least three different areas of expertise involved. Regarding firm size, exist-
ing classifications derived from the “Economic Institute for the Construction Industry” 
(Groot, Afrian, Hardeman, & Vrolijk, 2012) did not result in a meaningful distribution 
of cases because the DBFM projects in the present sample all involve large construc-
tion firms. The reason is that small companies cannot bear the relatively high financial 
risks involved in large DBFM projects. Therefore, a cluster analysis was performed 
with Tosmana (Cronqvist, 2011), which identified the annual revenue of €9,688 mil-
lion as the cutoff point. Note that, as an exception, Case-F and Case-G are assigned a 
calibrated score of 1.00 while having consortia of four firms; this was decided because 
in these two projects, although the firms are separate organizational entities, they are 
from the same parent company.
For the calibration of the public project management roles, again a cluster analysis 
was performed (Cronqvist, 2011). The so-called Normering Kerntaken Aanleg (in 
Dutch) does provide standards for the allocation of FTE in DBFM projects, but does 
not specify this to the different management roles. Because the accuracy of the data for 
the deployed management FTEs is not perfect (in consultation with Rijkswaterstaat), 
it was decided to adopt a conservative calibration strategy to avoid faux precision (cf. 
Gerrits & Verweij, 2018) and to distinguish between two set categories only: low and 
high deployment of FTE. Stakeholder management is calibrated as 0.00 [15.53%-
25.38%] and 1.00 [25.39%-37.88%], technical management as 0.00 [21.56%-27.32%] 
and 1.00 [27.33%-37.54%], and contract management as 0.00 [15.90%-23.02%] and 
1.00 [23.03%-35.26%]. Table 2 provides the raw data (except for the procurement 
result, to ensure anonymity of the cases) and the calibrated data of the study. To be 
included in the truth table analysis, QCA requires that all cases have full data. 
Therefore, Case-C, Case-D, Case-E, and Case-G are not included in the analysis in the 
section “Analysis and Results.”
Table 1. Calibration of the Composition of the Construction Consortium.
Many firms Few firms
Larger firms More than three firms; at least 
one firm with revenue above 
€9,688 million
Set membership: 0.00
Three firms or less; at least 
one firm with revenue above 
€9,688 million
Set membership: 0.66
Smaller firms More than three firms; all firms 
with revenue below €9,688 
million
Set membership: 0.33
Three firms or less; all firms 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18 Public Works Management & Policy 25(1)
Analysis and Results
Analysis of Necessity
Prior to the construction and analyses of the truth tables, a necessity test was per-
formed. For a condition to be considered necessary, it must have a consistency of at 
least 0.9 (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Basically, consistency expresses “the degree 
to which empirical evidence supports the claim that a set-theoretic relation exists” 
(Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. 182). In addition, coverage is a measure that helps to 
“gauge[s] empirical relevance or importance” (Ragin, 2006, p. 292). The test revealed 
no necessary conditions. The conditions with the highest consistency scores were a 
composition of the construction consortium with few firms (CompCons) [consistency: 
0.86221] and a low deployment of stakeholder management (~StakMan) [consistency: 
0.86357].
Construction of the Truth Tables
The truth table for the analysis with stakeholder management is provided as Table 3. 
Truth table rows that are devoid of cases are not shown. In addition to the regular raw 
consistency score, a high PRI-consistency (i.e., Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency) 
expresses that the truth table row is sufficient for the outcome “presence of innovation” 
and not simultaneously for the negated outcome (i.e., the absence of innovation; see 
Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Innovation occurred in all the cases in the first three 
truth table rows. The high consistency scores express this; the rows were hence assigned 
an outcome score of 1. Case-K in the fourth row did show innovation, but Case-L 
hardly showed any innovation (see Table 2). The fourth row is hence a so-called logical 
contradiction, where the evidence is too ambiguous to assign the configuration an out-
come score of 1 and thence include it in the subsequent analysis of the truth table. The 
row was therefore assigned an outcome score of 0, effectively excluding it from the 
analysis. The last row was also assigned an outcome score of 0 because innovation was 
absent in Case-I (see Table 2).
The truth tables with technical management and contract management are provided 
as Tables 4 and 5, respectively. The assignment of the outcome scores to the truth table 
Table 3. Truth Table With Stakeholder Management.
ProcRes CompCons StakMan Innovation Cases Raw Cons. PRI Cons.
1 1 0 1 Case-A, Case-J, 
Case-M
1.00000 1.00000
0 1 0 1 Case-B, Case-F 1.00000 1.00000
0 1 1 1 Case-H 1.00000 1.00000
1 0 0 0 Case-K, Case-L 0.60241 0.50376
0 0 0 0 Case-I 0.32673 0.00000
Note: PRI=Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency.
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Table 4. Truth Table With Technical Management.
ProcRes CompCons TechMan Innovation Cases Raw Cons. PRI Cons.
0 1 0 1 Case-B, Case-H 1.00000 1.00000
1 1 1 1 Case-J, Case-M 1.00000 1.00000
1 1 0 1 Case-A 1.00000 1.00000
0 1 1 1 Case-F 1.00000 1.00000
1 0 1 0 Case-K, Case-L 0.60241 0.50376
0 0 1 0 Case-I 0.32673 0.00000
Note: PRI=Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency.
Table 5. Truth Table With Contract Management.
ProcRes CompCons ContMan Innovation Cases Raw Cons. PRI Cons.
1 1 1 1 Case-A, Case-J, 
Case-M
1.00000 1.00000
0 1 0 1 Case-F, Case-H 1.00000 1.00000
1 0 0 1 Case-K 1.00000 1.00000
0 1 1 1 Case-B 1.00000 1.00000
1 0 1 0 Case-L 0.33333 0.00000
0 0 1 0 Case-I 0.32673 0.00000
Note: PRI=Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency.
rows followed the same process as described for Table 3. That is, effectively, only truth 
table rows with perfect consistency scores (i.e., all cases show innovation) are assigned 
an outcome score of 1.
Results of the Truth Table Analyses
The results of the truth table analyses (i.e., analyses of sufficiency) are provided in 
Table 6. All the results meet the standard consistency requirement of 0.75 (Ragin, 
2006). Table 6 shows six paths that are associated with innovation. The results of the 
analysis with stakeholder management indicate that a construction consortium with 
fewer firms (CompCons ≤ 3), combined with either a low-to-medium procurement 
result (~ProcRes) or a low deployment of stakeholder management (~StakMan), is 
associated with innovation. The results of the analysis with technical management 
indicate one path consisting of a single condition that is associated with innovation, 
namely, a construction consortium with fewer firms (CompCons ≤ 3; however, see the 
section “Robustness Test”). Finally, the truth table analysis with contract management 
resulted in three sufficient paths for the occurrence of innovation. First, a construction 
consortium with fewer firms (CompCons ≤ 3), combined with either a low-to-medium 
procurement result (~ProcRes) or a high deployment of contract management 
(ContMan), is associated with innovation. Second, innovation can also occur with a 
consortium with a larger number of firms (~CompCons) when the procurement result 
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In the absence of strong theoretical expectations about the relationships between 
the conditions and innovation, only the so-called conservative solutions are provided. 
This effectively means that the truth table rows that are devoid of cases were not 
included as counterfactuals in the truth table analysis (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018).1
Robustness Test
As explained in the section “Calibration Rules and Calibrated Data,” we adopted a 
conservative calibration strategy for the public project management conditions. To 
check the robustness of the analysis with this calibration (Skaaning, 2011), we also 
performed the analyses using a four-value fuzzy set calibration scheme, as with the 
conditions “procurement result” and “consortium composition” (see the section 
“Calibration Rules and Calibrated Data”). Using the cluster analysis in Tosmana 
(Cronqvist, 2011), we recalibrated the public project management conditions. 
Stakeholder management was recalibrated as 0.00 [15.53%-20.16%], 0.33 [20.17%-
25.38%], 0.66 [25.39%-33.54%], and 1.00 [33.55%-37.88%]; technical management 
as 0.00 [21.56%-27.32%], 0.33 [27.33%-32.03%], 0.66 [32.04%-35.12%], and 1.00 
[35.13%-37.54%]; and contract management as 0.00 [15.9%-18.16%], 0.33 [18.17%-
23.02%], 0.66 [23.03%-33.38%], and 1.00 [33.39%-35.26%].
The test showed that the results of the analysis are robust. The analysis with the 
recalibrated data again returned no necessary conditions. The results for the truth table 
analyses with contract management (applying a consistency cutoff of 0.79640) and 
stakeholder management also remained the same. However, the results for the analysis 
with technical management changed because Case-F and Case-K moved to different 
truth table rows. A construction consortium with fewer firms (CompCons ≤ 3) 
remained important, but now in combination with either a high procurement result 
(ProcRes) or a low deployment of technical management (~TechMan). When lowering 
the consistency cutoff to 0.75188 to include Case-K, the combination of a high pro-
curement result (ProcRes) with a low deployment of technical management 
(~TechMan) was additionally also associated with innovation. This means that the 
results for the analysis with technical management in Table 6 are somewhat robust 
with CompCons still at the core, but that they do become more complex in the recali-
brated analysis.
Discussion and Conclusion
Discussion of the Results
To aid the interpretation of the results, Figure 1 depicts the five solution paths from 
the results of the analysis. The paths correspond to the minimized configurations 
(paths) in Table 6.
The results clearly indicate the importance of a private construction consortium 
composed of a few number of firms (CompCons), thereby confirming the theoretical 
expectation (see the section “Composition of the Private Construction Consortium”). 
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This is indicated by Path 1 in Figure 1. The condition was found to be not quite neces-
sary (see the section “Analysis of Necessity”), which is caused by Case-K that shows 
that innovation may also occur in a consortium with a larger number of firms. 
However, the truth table analysis does indicate the association between the composi-
tion of the consortium and the occurrence of innovation (see Table 6). This is further-
more supported by all the other minimized configurations also containing the 
condition CompCons, with the exception of Path 5 (see Figure 1). Based on particu-
larly Path 1, the results suggest that consortia consisting of a small number of firms 
may benefit from a collaborative advantage; fewer participating firms may make col-
laboration and trust building easier, have lower transaction costs, and are therefore 
better conductors for innovation (see the section “Composition of the Private 
Construction Consortium”). Although important, a consortium consisting of a small 
number of firms cannot fully explain innovation. This is indicated by Paths 2 to 4 in 
Figure 1 and supported by the truth table analyses with stakeholder management and 
contract management (Results StakMan and ContMan; Table 6) and the robustness 
test (see the section “Robustness Test”).
Figure 1. Solution paths from the three truth table analyses.
Note. TPP = technological product and process.
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First of all, the results show that a consortium with few firms (CompCons), com-
bined with a low procurement result (~ProcRes), is related to the occurrence of inno-
vation. This is indicated by Path 2 in Figure 1. A possible explanation is that fewer 
private partners make risk allocation and management easier (CompCons), which 
makes making a more realistic and competitive bid on the contract easier and which, 
in turn, translates into a lower procurement result (~ProcRes).2 It can be noted that 
Path 5 in Figure 1 provides the mirror image, which supports the idea that when more 
firms are involved, producing a realistic bid may be more challenging, resulting in a 
higher procurement result.
Second, a consortium with few firms, combined with the deployment of public 
project management roles, is related to innovation. This is indicated by Paths 3 and 4 
in Figure 1. The truth table analysis with stakeholder management shows that, when 
the private consortia consist of few firms (CompCons), they may benefit from a rela-
tively low deployment of stakeholder management by the public partner (~StakMan; 
Path 3). This result is contrary to the idea that innovative solutions proposed in bids 
ask for more intensive public stakeholder management to interactively implement the 
innovation in the complex project’s stakeholder environment (see the section “Project 
Management by the Public Partner”). A possible explanation is that the private consor-
tia, which all consist of few firms—that are also small—are very capable of stake-
holder management themselves. In fact, small firms (CompCons) are said to have 
communication and coordination advantages (cf. Spescha, 2018; see the section 
“Composition of the Private Construction Consortium”) and this may extend to stake-
holder management, thus requiring only a low stakeholder management input from the 
public partner (~StakMan). Small firms are typically involved in innovations that 
involve interactive processes, which means that they are more likely to possess the 
required stakeholder management capacities through experience.
It is also noteworthy that the truth table analysis shows that technical management 
is not associated with innovation (see Table 6). The condition is absent in Figure 1. 
This is contrary to the idea that innovative bids by private consortia call upon the 
capacity of public technical managers to help in the implementation of the innovations 
by, for example, supporting actions in grant applications or information supply (see 
the section “Project Management by the Public Partner”). Possibly, this result is 
explained by the fact that the innovations, save for one, are all market-driven (see 
Table 2). The public technical manager may commission studies, supply information, 
support subsidy and grant applications, investigate possibilities for innovations, and so 
on (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018; see the section “Project Management by the 
Public Partner”). However, because the innovations were market-driven, this could 
imply that the public technical manager had no big role to play here. Another explana-
tion is that technical managers are involved most dominantly in the bidding phase and 
that their role with respect to innovation has largely been played when the project 
enters the implementation phase.
Regarding contract management by the public partner, the truth table analysis 
indeed indicates that it can be related to innovation in different ways (ContMan and 
~ContMan; see Table 6). This is indicated by Paths 4 and 5 in Figure 1. On one hand, 
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the public contract manager can create room for the private partner to innovate by 
providing permissions, accepting risks, and setting the framework rules (cf. Grotenbreg 
& Van Buuren, 2018). On the other hand, he or she may also aim to minimize risk and 
decrease complexity and stimulate the use of proven technologies instead (Hertogh & 
Westerveld, 2010). The analyses suggest a similar duality. In the case of consortia 
consisting of fewer and smaller firms (CompCons), public contract management had 
a stronger presence in the projects (ContMan), as indicated by Path 4. In the case of 
consortia with more firms (~CompCons), public contract management was less pres-
ent (~ContMan), as indicated by Path 5. These results mirror each other. A possible 
explanation is that consortia consisting of fewer and smaller firms have a stronger 
tendency to be competitive through product-oriented innovations, which may lead to 
contract negotiations and changes, which is the domain of the contract manager (Path 
4). The result depicted as Path 5, however, is covered by only case and the low cover-
age for that path (see Table 6) limits interpretation. Based on the analysis, it is difficult 
to identify conclusively how the public contract management role was played.
Discussion of Limitations and Further Research
The present study measured the public project management by the amount of allocated 
FTE. The advantage of this approach is that it is a relatively efficient and objective way 
of measuring management capacity. The downside is that measurement through FTE 
obscures the importance of how management roles are played. The present study did not 
analyze how the management roles were performed qualitatively and this may have 
contributed to its somewhat diffuse findings regarding public project management. 
Future research may inquire into the ways public project managers can facilitate or con-
strain innovation in PPP projects. A second measurement issue concerns the composition 
of the private consortium, which was defined by the number and sizes of the firms (see 
the section “Measurement and Data”). Data were available on these indicators and they 
were relatively easy to measure. The downside is that this measurement obscures the 
importance of the organizational structure of the private consortium and how risks are 
allocated between the private partners. For instance, certain firms may be more willing 
to assume certain types or degrees of risks than other firms and this may affect how risks 
are allocated and what risks are taken by the consortium in the first place (Eaton et al., 
2006). Future research may inquire into the relationship between the organizational 
structure of the consortium and other organizational features, on one hand, and innova-
tion, on the other. A promising approach, for instance, is to use network theory to analyze 
the organizational structures (see Chowdhury, Chen, & Tiong, 2011) and combine it with 
QCA to test which structures are associated with innovation.
A third issue stems from the number of cases. Although nine cases is an analyzable 
number in QCA, it sets a limit to the number of conditions that could be included in the 
analysis (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018). This problem was addressed by conducting separate 
analyses for the different public project management roles. However, the idea of the 
IPM model used in the public management of PPP projects is that the interests and 
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goals related to stakeholder management, technical management, and contract manage-
ment are implemented and safeguarded in a balanced manner (Reinking, 2014; 
Rijkswaterstaat, 2014b). This implies that the degree to which innovation is facilitated, 
or perhaps even stimulated, in PPP projects may rely on how these interests and goals 
in fact interact and balance out in the IPM model on the project level. Additional con-
figurational analyses may inquire into this balancing but will need more cases. When 
more cases are available, other conditions such as project sector, project complexity, or 
contract type (e.g., DBFM vs. Design-and-Construct) may also be included. This would 
allow a more refined analysis of how innovation occurs less or more in different infra-
structure sectors and contract types and of the influence of project complexity on the 
need or willingness of the tenderers to introduce innovations in their bids.
Fourth, regarding the types of cases, this study focused on innovations incorporated 
in the bids of private partners and on DBFM projects only. DBFM is the standard PPP 
option in the Netherlands and it is applied to large, national-level projects (Lenferink 
et al., 2013). The transfer of risk to the private sector through private project 
financing—the F in DBFM—is an essential element of this type of PPP. The private 
partner is stimulated to achieve the project milestones on time; otherwise, it is penal-
ized and payments by the public partner are delayed, which means that it may have to 
pay additional interest to the financiers that provided the loans to the consortium. This 
often incentivizes risk-averse strategies. Scholars have hence observed that innova-
tions in these PPPs are often incremental at best (Himmel & Siemiatycki, 2017; 
Roumboutsos & Saussier, 2014), or that private consortia revert to tried-and-tested 
strategies to minimize risk. This first raises the question as to whether a higher pro-
curement result may actually be an indication for low-risk project implementation 
strategies and therefore a low degree of innovation. Future research comparatively 
analyzing PPPs with little innovation may delve into this. Moreover, it raises questions 
of the extent to which innovations have actually materialized at the end of the project 
implementation, of how DBFM contracts can be made more flexible (Demirel, 
Leendertse, Volker, & Hertogh, 2017) to simulate innovation, and whether other types 
of PPP are more conducive of innovation (Van den Hurk & Verweij, 2017). For 
instance, alliances focus on risk sharing instead of risk transfer and this may allow the 
partners to accept more risk resulting in more innovation (cf. Leendertse, 2015). Future 
research may focus on comparatively analyzing different types of PPPs and PPP con-
tracts and answer these questions.
Final Conclusion
This article set out to explore the role of the public partner in innovation in infrastructure 
PPPs. The study focused on three conditions that concern the role of the public partner 
in innovation: the procurement result, the choice for a certain consortium composition, 
and public project management. The results especially suggest that bids by private con-
sortia composed of a few firms, generally of smaller size (CompCons), are more innova-
tive. This observation is interesting in light of recent concerns expressed by highly 
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placed policy makers in the Netherlands. They are concerned with the low degree of 
innovation by the market in the infrastructure sector and argue that innovation processes 
need to speed up to address pressing societal and technological challenges, such as cli-
mate change and big data (Koenen, 2018). The results in this article may instigate policy 
makers to explore the idea to procure smaller projects instead of the current DBFM 
megaprojects, thereby attracting bids by smaller consortia with a strong motivation to 
innovate. This would simultaneously address the recent concerns expressed by construc-
tion companies that the DBFM projects are getting too big and too risky, sometimes 
leading to major financial problems for the companies involved (Koenen, 2019).
The study also addresses the role of public project management in innovation in 
PPPs. Management by the public partner is associated with innovation, but not in a 
straightforward way. The results indicate that a low deployment of public stakeholder 
management or a low or high deployment of contract management, depending on the 
composition of the private constructing consortium, is associated with innovation. 
More important, however, is how public project managers actually play their role in 
PPPs. In that respect, because of the strictly separated management responsibilities 
present in DBFM that are often little conducive of collaborative behavior (Verweij 
et al., 2017), other forms of PPPs beyond DBFM are interesting to investigate.
Appendix





driven or client-driven? What are the innovations?
Case-A Yes Client-driven Implementation of pilot circular 
viaduct
Case-B Yes Market-driven Rejuvenation top layer asphalt
Case-C Yes Market-driven Application new type of asphalt; 
application prefabricated pillars; 
implementation new design solutions
Case-D No Neither None
Case-E n/a n/a n/a
Case-F Yes Market-driven Application new process and timing 
for asphalt repairs
Case-G n/a n/a n/a
Case-H Yes Market-driven Application fiber reinforced, 
recycled, and low-temperature 
asphalt; application new process 
for lifetime extending maintenance; 
implementation removable markings 
and LED lightning; application of 
noise-reducing concrete
 (continued)
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Notes
1. The parsimonious solutions for the analyses with StakMan, TechMan, and ContMan, 
respectively, are as follows: CompCons → Innovation [cons. 1.00000, cov. 0.86221], 
CompCons → Innovation [cons. 1.00000, cov. 0.86221], and ~ContMan + CompCons 
→ Innovation [cons. 1.00000, cov. 1.00000]. The intermediate solutions for the analy-
ses with StakMan, TechMan, and ContMan, respectively, are as follows: CompCons → 
Innovation [cons. 1.00000, cov. 0.86221] (model: all conditions present), CompCons → 
Innovation [cons. 1.00000, cov. 0.86221] (model: all conditions present), and CompCons 
+ ProcRes*~ContMan → Innovation [cons. 1.00000; cov. 0.95362] (model: ProcRes and 
CompCons present).
2. This finding, together with the fact that—although the majority of the projects with innova-
tion also had a high procurement result (57%)—nearly half of the projects were considered 
innovative, given a low procurement result (43%; see Table 2), leads to the conclusion that 





driven or client-driven? What are the innovations?
Case-I No Neither None
Case-J Yes Market-driven n/a
Case-K Yes Market-driven Development energy-neutral 
operating locks
Case-L Partly Market-driven Offer to implement solar panels; 
sustainable concrete; new measures 
for lock impact protection
Case-M Yes Market-driven Implementation low-weight 
doors; application of eco-filter 
measurement tool
Table A1. (continued)
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with innovation because the private consortium would feel an incentive to include creative 
and innovative solutions in its bid to maintain a profitable business case (cf. the section 
“Procurement Result”).
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